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FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Mati L. Pal* 
It is really a pity that Ambassador Koh is not here at this late 
hour to present these intricate issues. We do need someone of the 
stature and expertise of Ambassador Koh, but unfortunately his 
services are needed elsewhere and we will try our best with the 
resources we have at our disposal. I just hope that you are getting 
your money's worth. 
Speaking of money, that is exactly the topic that is dealt with 
in Negotiating Group Two. This group is dealing with financial 
arrangements between the contractor or the party which would be 
mining manganese nodules, and the International Seabed Author-
ity. The contractor or party may be a state, state sponsored, or 
private party while the Authority is the representative of mankind, 
the common heritage of which are those manganese nodules. 
To speak in simplistic terms the issues that are dealt with in 
the negotiating group fall into three groups: what kinds of payments 
would the contractor make to the Authority, when the payments 
would be made, and how much would be paid. So far there has been 
discussion centered around four kinds of payments. First, a rela-
tively small amount of application fee would be paid at the time 
when the application for the contract is submitted. This fee is sup-
posed to take care of the processing costs of the application. Second, 
another relatively small fee called the annual fixed fee would be 
paid between the time the contract comes into force and the time 
production starts from those seabed mine sites. 
The third and major part of the revenues of the Authority would 
come from one of two alternative systems of payments. The concept 
of the single system composed of a production charge is similar to 
royalties in the conventional jargon. That production charge would 
be paid every year on the basis of the gross revenues of those mining 
operations irrespective of the costs of those mining operations. Fi-
nally, the alternative systems, the so-called mixed system whereby 
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the contractor pays a relatively small production charge on the basis 
of the gross revenues and an amount which would be levied on the 
basis of the net revenues, that is, after you take out the cost of 
production from the gross sales of the output. The two systems are 
necessary to accomodate different socio-economic systems. There 
are economic systems in the world such as socialist countries which 
do not have the concept of net revenues or profits. The part of the 
Authority's income which comes from the net proceeds is compara-
ble to or can be thought of as an income tax, a corporation tax, or 
profit tax. Those economic systems where there is no concept of 
profit would like to pay in an alternative way and that is why the 
single system of only a production charge was envisaged. In the 
final analysis there has to be some comparability between these 
two systems. The choice will lie with the contractor and once the 
choice is made there is some debate whether that choice will be 
revokable, or irreversible. 
Negotiations dealing with the financial arrangements have re-
quired a tremendous effort on the part of all of the delegations to 
come to a consensus that there will be these four kinds of payments. 
No country is saying that it accepts the whole set of terms, but all 
countries indicate that they can live with tkte structure. 
The real issue and problem area will come at the next stage 
which deals with the question of the amount of payment the con-
tractors will make. This question really centers around two major 
issues. First, what is the profitability of these mining operations in 
the deep sea. If it is very profitable then the miners can afford to 
pay quite a large amount, if it is not profitable they cannot pay 
much. Integral to this issue is the question of the uncertainty of 
profitable operations and we have to establish a system that accom-
modates this uncertainty. 
The second major issue is what is reasonable remuneration or 
reasonable return to the resource owner on one side, and to the 
resource exploiter on the other side. This issue may be recognized 
as an income distribution problem between land and capital com-
pounded by political and technical issues. Even if we can think of 
a world that is free of political values, the scientists who are sup-
posed to be politically value free do not have an answer to this kind 
of question. 
On top of the technical complexity of the problem you have 
political factors. Consequently, two trends have developed to deal 
with the problem. One trend has been to look for some technical 
solutions under certain political assumptions and to pass those tech-
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nical solutions as being value free solutions. The other trend has 
been to assume that there are no technically objective solutions to 
these problems. Instead, it should be regarded as an essentially 
political problem requiring a political solution. This problem comes 
up in the matter of the reasonable revenue issue. The determination 
must be made as to what rate of return should one aim for the 
contractors on one side and for the Authority on 'the other side. 
Regardless of the fact that there are presently no definite tech-
nical solutions, there have been some attempts to solve the problem. 
The miners have introduced a concept called internal rate of return 
or discounted cash flow rate of return. This concept means that they 
will be receiving revenues from the mining operations, and they will 
be paying money out to receive those revenues. There are cash in-
flows and cash outflows. Those inflows and outflows are taking place 
at the present and also in the future. The future money is worth less 
at this moment because you have to discount to take into account 
uncertainty and waiting. If you do discount it, what is the rate 
which will make the present value of those future cash inflows equal 
to the present value of the future cash outflows? This is the concept 
of internal rate of return or the discounted cash flow rate of return. 
This seems like a nice concept, but what is that internal rate of 
return? Is it 1 % or 15% or 30%? I do not think anybody has the 
answer. Once again, experts are trying to find out what the factors 
are on which the magnitude of the value of the internal rate of 
return depends. One obvious factor is general economic conditions. 
If general economic conditions are quite healthy, one would be will-
ing to take a lesser amount per dollar investment. The second factor 
is general industrial outlook. If the industrial outlook seems to be 
quite rosy, for a dollar today an investor would be willing to receive 
a lesser rate of return than if the industry outlook is rather bleak. 
Finally, above all, we have the risks which fall into several catego-
ries. One is human beings incapability of seeing into the future, 
which itself is uncertain, and with that uncertainty there is risk. We 
also have the risk regarding the technology which has not been tried 
out. Consequently, we do not know how the technology would per-
form, what kind of incomes they would bring. Furthermore, we have 
the economic risk that the prices of raw materials may change, 
including prices of the metals mined by the contractors. Finally, we 
have political risks. The miner does not know what kind of political 
regime under which he would be working. This problem arises fre-
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quently in mining contracts in the developing countries where re-
gimes are not as stable. 
So we have these elements which determine internal rate of 
return although we do not know the value of the variable, the mag-
nitude of the internal rate of return variable. Not only is it a varia-
ble, it changes from one contractor to another contractor, depending 
on several factors, e.g., that particular company's debt-equity ratio. 
M.l.T. has come out with a model that if you use more debt you get 
a higher internal rate of return from the project than if you use your 
equity capital. This debt-equity ratio varies from project to project, 
from company to company. Also cash position varies from company 
to company. A company which is in a better cash position can afford 
to spend that cash for a lesser return than a company which is hard 
up for cash. Finally, we have individual subjective evaluation of 
those risks mentioned. Some companies might think that those risks 
are worth taking, some other companies might think they are worth 
taking if the project returns 35% for their money. This issue of 
subjective evaluation comes up quite often. For example, the Group 
of 77, the developing countries, says that the political risks here are 
less because there is an international authority representing man-
kind, all the nations together, and it is more dependable as com-
pared with an unstable nationalist regime. On the other hand, the 
miners point out that the Authority is an entirely new entity and 
although it is true that this is an international authority, it is not 
known how it will behave. They may perceive that the risks involved 
dealing with this International Seabed Authority are quite high, 
high even compared to an unstable national regime. This just points 
out the subjective evaluation of the risks involved. 
All these factors point to the fact that the nice concept of inter-
nal rate of return does not really give a particular solution on the 
basis of which the Authority can formulate its general tax scheme, 
applicable under varying conditions, to different contractors. So 
what can one do? Should we go for one particular value, or should 
we go for a political solution of negotiation and bargaining, and 
thereby reach a particular solution? Ambassador Koh; who is the 
Chairman of the Negotiating Group which deals with the financial 
arrangements, seems to believe in the political negotiation school of 
thought where people dispense with arguing over what may be 
considered pseudo-objective solutions, and instead aim for a 
political solution to a political problem. As I have pointed out 
there have been other proponents, mostly industrialized countries 
and the miners, who do come up with some sort of objective mea-
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sures like the internal rate of return as discussed above, the oppor-
tunity cost of capital, or even a general rate of profit in an economy. 
There are the two complex issues the Negotiating Group is 
presently deliberating on. Hopefully, in the next session or in the 
process of negotiation, exchanges of ideas, and consultations, they 
will come to some kind of a solution. 
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PANEL DISCUSSION 
MR. HULL: Thank you very much, Mr. Pal. 
MR. HERMAN: I think that was a good expose of the problems 
that we face at the conference, when in effect we are trying to draft 
an international system of taxation. We are talking about an income 
tax act or revenue act which we will apply in treaty form. You can 
imagine the difficulties in trying to come to grips with these various 
problems. It strikes me that this is a perfect example of trying to 
balance interests in the Law of the Sea Conference because on the 
one hand we want to provide for a system of financial arrangements 
or "tax" that would not discourage seabed mining but that would 
in fact encourage seabed mining. The one thing that I think indus-
trialized countries insist on is a system of financial arrangements or 
payments which will not inhibit seabed mining. If it does, I do not 
see any way that the industrialized countries would buy it. That is 
what rate of return is all about. We are trying to find a system 
which, on the basis of the figures as we know them today, will 
provide companies with a decent rate of return, and I think that is 
the bottom line for industrialized countries. I am not saying that is 
necessarily the Canadian view. I am just saying that based on what 
I have heard in negotiations and as a participant, the industrialized 
countries as a whole, are saying that they are not going to go home 
with a treaty that cannot guarantee a decent rate of return to their 
companies. 
The second value that has to be balanced against this is the 
need to insure that there is a flow of capital to the Authority. What-
ever the mining companies may say about the common heritage of 
mankind, whether we agree with it as a legal principle or not, it is 
a political fact that we are talking about common, or shared re-
sources, and to strike a deal with developing countries we have to 
insure that there is a return of monies to the Authority. We have 
got to balance these two things. 
I think that one point which Mr. Pal did not mention and which 
is a very difficult point at the negotiations, is that whatever system 
of financial payments is devised, it has to insure, at least from the 
point of view of most of the industrialized countries, that the Au-
thority does not have any possibility of reaching into national juris-
diction to tax the companies. That is a real problem. There is a great 
fear among many of the industrialized countries that if you are not 
careful the Authority is going to start looking at downstream opera-
tions and start taxing mining companies as they refine nickel on 
land, which is something I do not think any country is prepared to 
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give up. Certainly I can say that Canada is not prepared to see the 
International Authority tax any companies that produce nickel from 
the seabed and refine it in Canada. So you have to separate out the 
mining sector. That is a real problem. You have to isolate the 
amount of net proceeds that a total operation produces, and within 
that you have to isolate the amount that is attributable to the 
mining sector, and that is a great problem. Ambassador Koh has 
suggested that 40% of total net proceeds would be attributable to 
the mining sector. These things all have to be negotiated and are 
just an illustration of the problems we face. 
MR. PAL: What Mr. Herman pointed out is an illustration of 
what I was talking about. It is true that if you look at it in terms of 
jurisdiction there is a debate whether an international authority 
should be able to levy charges on the activity which is taking place 
within a national jurisdiction. But there again the problem comes 
up concerning what part of the income of the total integrated opera-
tion is attributable to the mining sector and to the national jurisdic-
tion. Again there exists this baffling question of lack of objective 
criteria. We have pointed out that only Ambassador Koh has em-
phasized the fact that this division is again a political issue requir-
ing a bargaining decision and there are no objective criteria. 
MR. HULL: It has been a long time since I have worn a U.S. hat 
and since we have able representatives of the United States Govern-
ment here they should probably speak to the issue or raise the 
question, but why talk in terms of front end-loads of payments 
before the question of profits arises? Why not talk simply in terms 
of profits and a royalty on those profits as opposed to a set fee? 
MR. PAL: Okay. We can think of the so-called front-end pay-
ments, or front-end loading, as the annual fixed fee which I have 
mentioned. That is a fee paid by the contractor before any produc-
tion takes place, and before he makes a profit of any kind. Then 
we have the production charge or the royalty which is also inde-
pendent of the profit he makes. So the question Mr. Hull has 
raised is: why add to his costs, why not depend on the so-called 
back-end which depends on whether he is making profits or not 
and what his profits are, and then take a share out of that. 
There are two problems involved here. First, there is a need for 
funds for an International Authority for several reasons. These are 
the resources, benefits from which would be shared by mankind, in 
the sense of benefits or assistance to developing countries, or com-
pensation to the countries whose economy has been affected due to 
the seabed mining. There is a need for funds for the Authority in 
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the beginning and so the Authority has to depend on some kind of 
system to get those funds. Also, if we think about the International 
Authority as some kind of guardian of the resources and private or 
state contractors as exploiters of the resources then those resources 
are going away from mankind. The so-called common heritage of 
mankind now becomes the private source of income for somebody. 
So in order to make this transition you must think of some pay-
ments which compensate for this transition. 
MR. HULL: The last group that I would want to represent today, 
for various reasons, is industry. It seems to me that what we are 
doing with industry is potentially presenting it with a pig in a poke, 
asking industry in effect to pay for something which may result in 
some profit to it or which may not. Although it is fair to say that 
the common heritage of mankind should result, in any case, in a 
certain profit to mankind, it would seem that profit should come out 
of profits as opposed to something simply put up for potential prof-
its which may turn out to be a loser. 
MR. PAL: As Mr. Hull has pointed out again there are two 
conflicting objectives we are trying to achieve. One is that some 
reasonable profit should go to the miner and the other is that some 
funds should go to the Authority. And there again a balancing act 
has been going on and I can assure you in an optimistic tone, that 
in this area there seems to be some consensus in the sense that the 
balancing act has finally come to a resolution in that the front-end 
loading will be quite minor compared to the so-called back-end 
loading. And at this point at least we can say that this seems to be 
a solution compared even to a year back or two years back. Once 
again, the kind of balancing act that we have been depending on has 
worked and hopefully will continue to work in other areas too. 
MR. HERMAN: I might just make a couple of comments. I think 
it is important to realize that one of the reasons, or perhaps the 
reason, that the conference is attempting to draft a series of provi-
sions which approximate an international agreement for taxing min-
ing companies is because of the very problem of front-end loading. 
It would have been fairly simple to provide for a royalty system 
which would be levied against gross proceeds from seabed opera-
tions or against a rate of recovery of seabed nodules that would be 
a fixed rate applied very simply against the reasonably ascertain-
able figure. But the industrialized countries, or many of the indus-
trialized countries said that it would be very difficult for them to 
accept a royalty system which would be applied irrespective of prof-
its, and that if this is going to be a workable or equitable proposition 
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and politically salable from their point of view, then the Authority 
has to share in the risks. What that means is that if there are profits, 
the Authority gets a share of the profits; if there are no profits, the 
Authority does not get a share of the profits. This is an alternative 
to a royalty system which, I think, would have been a most simple 
solution. Because of a need to provide for some element of risk 
sharing, we are now drafting a system of "taxation." And I say 
taxation in quotes. But that is what it amounts to. The only coun-
tries that accepted a royalty type system, which want a royalty type 
system, are the socialist countries simply because they do not know 
the notion of profits and so for their purposes we have. as an option 
a royalty type system for those countries that wish to use that type 
of approach. 
DR. MCKELVEY: Roger, first, in answer to your comment or 
question as to why permit or have a front-end loading system or a 
system that adds to the front-end load, I might just point out for 
the record that this is not uncommon on the part of the landlord, 
whether private or public, to try to get some advance payment. In 
a sense he wants to sell hunting licenses and the U.S. Government 
does this with respect to the offshore oil leases where, for the right 
to do exploratory drilling, the companies bid on a cash bonus which, 
as you know, may be as much as many scores of millions of dollars, 
and that is paid whether or not there is any profitable discovery or 
not. I would like to point out that the companies are not just bidding 
on a pig in a poke but on a poke which may or may not contain a 
pig. And I think it is true that, as Mati indicated that not only is 
Ambassador Koh tending to think along the line of political negotia-
tions as the route to the answers to some of these difficult questions, 
but that, in fact, that really is what the process involves. There is 
always that uncertain amount of negotiation between the resource 
owner and the would-be producer. But to put some of these things 
in relatively simple terms, there are realities or facts of life that have 
to be taken into account. First of all, there has got to be a reasonable 
rate of additional return on that investment. In an operation of this 
kind where there is high risk, it is reasonable that there be an objec-
tive in sight. Whether it can be realized or not is another thing, but 
there is at least a chance of a relatively high rate of return. You 
know you can buy a treasury bill now and expect to get 10%, and 
all it takes is a phone call and the capital. There is no effort on your 
part, no risk whatsoever, and you are assured a 10% rate of return. 
So you are not going to do something very risky that you know is 
not going to bring you back a lot more than 10%, and 25% or 30% is 
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often what is hoped for, but generally what is realized is a good deal 
less than that, and of course that is why the target is high. There 
must also be remuneration for the costs of operations, and there 
must also be a profit to management on those operations. Not only 
must management get its money back in the form of the actual 
expenditures and operating costs, but it, as a manager, is entitled 
to some profit. Otherwise why be engaged in the activity; why not 
spend your time on something that you are going to get paid for? 
Profit to management is often thought of as 15% of the investment. 
If you remember, the concept of economic rent is the amount left 
over from the revenue after all of the costs, risks, and the reasonable 
profits have been taken by the producers. Whatever gravy is above 
these costs and reasonable profits, that is the target for the resource 
owner. That is where typically the negotiation actually takes place. 
The landlord wants to get as much as he can and the producer wants 
to get as much of that as he can. So even though negotiation is 
involved, and there are these uncertainties that Mati spoke about 
in knowing just what these costs and so on are with an industry that 
has yet even to begin a commercial operation, nevertheless those 
realities do have to be kept in mind in the negotiating process, and 
cannot be divorced from those considerations and kept apart very 
far. 
MR. PAL: I do agree with Dr. McKelvey and it is true that there 
has to be some return to the capital and then to management. What 
I was trying to point out is that it is difficult to pinpoint the percen-
tage. The more important factor, at least in my mind, arises in 
relation to your example of picking up the phone and getting 10%. 
This represents a private pecuniary return. In my mind there are 
three kinds of considerations that may come into the calculation of 
the rate of return. One is the private nonpecuniary considerations. 
There is an assurance of supply of raw materials for a parent com-
pany and the parent company may think there is a trade off between 
this assurance and the percentage return it is taking. There is a 
trade off there between private pecuniary and private nonpecuniary 
considerations. There is again a trade off between the social costs 
and benefits and the private costs and benefits. A society as a whole, 
if it goes into deep seabed mining, may have costs, benefits, and a 
social rate of return which are quite different from the private costs, 
benefits, and the private rate of return. I can think of several reasons 
why it would be different. The assurance of access to metals is one. 
In view of all the talk about the exhaustion ofland-based minerals, 
we now have a new source of minerals. From the social and .global 
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point of view that is a positive factor for which one may trade off a 
part of one's pecuniary or financial return. We also have to think 
about the sea as a new frontier. Society as a whole, the global com-
munity as a whole, can think of a new frontier being opened and for 
that consideration it may be willing to take a lower dollar return. 
Generally, in my mind, it seems not only that the pecuniary 
return is a variable that is difficult to pinpoint, but there are all 
kinds of nonpecuniary considerations both from the private point 
of view and the social point of view. However, in no way am I saying 
that there will not be a return for those dollars; it is simply a prob-
lem to pin down the rate of pecuniary return so that the tax revenues 
can be calculated assuring that elusive part to the contractor. 
MR. LEE: I think this afternoon's discussion is particularly use-
ful in singling out some of the technically difficult tasks that the 
conference has been asked to perform. Earlier we heard that the 
Conference has been asked to produce a detailed mining code and 
then Larry presented the difficulty in determining the production 
mining limits. Now we have heard about the difficulty in presenting 
a tax system. If you put all these together they illustrate how diffi-
cult it is to achieve all this within the time period available when 
you have to negotiate simultaneously over 150 states using six lan-
guages and at the same time producing documents also in six lan-
guages. If the Congress appreciated the time that is required to 
negotiate these instruments, perhaps it would be more patient in 
waiting for the results to be achieved. Secondly, I think the panelists 
have brought out the difficulty in obtaining objective data, particu-
larly in establishing financial arrangements. The lack of such objec-
tive data prevented a really successful exercise to determine all the 
detailed figures that are required. Yet all of this is in fact asked by 
the industries. They would like to see this in black and white and 
embodied in the treaties. 
I would like to ask two questions in this connection. After all 
we must not forget the two basic objectives of the financial arrange-
ment. One is that the financial arrangement will bring in some 
income for the Authority, and hopefully this income will be shared 
by mankind. I was wondering if I may ask Mati whether, in his 
personal view, he sees that there will be much income coming from 
these financial arrangements, taking into account the number of 
mine sites that will be available. 
Secondly, in Ambassador Aldrich's statement he mentioned 
that one of the most important things on the reverse side is to insure 
that the Enterprise will be able to finance its operations. That 
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means that we will need quite a substantial fund to finance the 
Enterprise. Now one way of getting this fund is from these unre-
served sites through the contractor and use these funds to finance 
the Enterprise. I would like to ask Mati whether, in his personal 
view, this financial income obtained can be used to finance the 
Enterprise. I think it is very important to look at it from the finan-
cial point of view because that really determines or highlights the 
objective of the whole exercise of the seabed mining. 
MR. PAL: This is definitely my personal view and has nothing 
to do with Ambassador Koh, the United Nations, Bangladesh, Yale 
University, or any affiliation which I have. Also do not ask me to 
back it up with research because that way I will spend the rest of 
my life in researching the two statements I am going to make. 
First of all, I do not think that there is a big pool of resources 
coming out of payments .from the deep seabed taxation or whatever 
you call it. Surely there is not enough to solve or ameliorate all the 
problems of the poverty or the lack of development in all the devel-
oping countries. 
Secondly, I do not think that there will be enough funds coming 
from these payments to make a going enterprise. There can be 
enough funds, but again, the taxation may be so high that it may 
choke off the source of tax itself, meaning that you will kill the goose 
itself in the process. 
DR. MCKELVEY: Roger, I would like your permission to return 
to a subject that was discussed earlier during the day on which I did 
not have an opportunity to speak. I am referring first, to the com-
mercial interest in the manganese nodules. Dick, I believe, indi-
cated in his talk there was not commercial interest in the recovery 
of the manganese and generally that has been true with one excep-
tion. Deepsea Ventures was taken over a few years ago by U.S. Steel. 
U.S. Steel's main interest, they say, is in manganese. Their interest 
in it is out of their concern that there may be a manganese shortage 
developing in the mid 1980's. As you may know, manganese is abso-
lutely essential in the manufacture of steel and there is no known 
substitute for it. Reference was made to the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense's remark that in essence there were unlimited resources of 
manganese. However, I think it is important to point out that he is 
not usually considered an authority on mineral resources. I do not 
know where he got his information, but I think he may not have 
understood the information. Published estimates of the United 
States Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines are made of 
resources, referring to deposits that are either undiscovered but pre-
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sumed to exist on the basis of geologic evidence, or that are not 
presently economically usuable or available. The published esti-
mates are also of reserves, referring to deposits that are known and 
that can be produced at present prices. Both industry and the sur-
vey of the Bureau of Mines further subdivided reserves into catego-
ries such as crude, possible, or probable and possible, or in the case 
of the survey of the Bureau of Mines similar but not exactly compa-
rable measures are employed. Proved reserves are known with a 
good deal of certainty, as estimates of this kind go, but they are not 
like other stock that can be counted on a shelf so there is a fair 
amount of uncertainty even with respect to proved or measured 
reserves. The estimates published by the Geological Survey and the 
Bureau of Mines of world manganese resources are of undifferen-
tiated reserves and resources. Consequently, in the survey, the Bu-
reau of Mines people have no way of knowing the deductions with 
respect to the estimates of other countries which involve piecing 
together all sorts of pieces of information and speculations. This 
leads to a good deal of uncertainty. Although these estir~ates are 
fairly high, keep in mind the great uncertainty attached to them. 
Estimates furnished to the Congress a year ago by United States 
Steel are proved reserves, and at projected rates of consumption for 
manganese, would have a life of somewhat less than thirty years. So 
that unless additional exploration is not only pressed but is success-
ful there could be a shortage of manganese with respect to supply 
developing before that period. I think of more concern to United 
States Steel are two other things. One is the fact that they do not 
see the present production capacity developing enough to keep 
pace with demand beyond some time in the early 1980's. The other 
concern is that while nickel is produced in a great many different 
countries, although mainly produced in Canada, three countries, 
the U.S.S.R., South Africa, and Gabon, are the prime sources of 
manganese. Therefore, there is some concern about the stability of 
the supply of manganese in the future. 
Some of these concerns that I mentioned are those of United 
States Steel, and they depend on production and other factors. I am 
merely reporting them rather than defending them. I can say that 
it is certainly true that production capacity has got to develop if 
there is going to be continued growth in demand and that additional 
exploration has got to be successful if proved reserves are going to 
be extended much beyond what I have indicated. I think Larry 
asked this morning, what is the urgency in the seabed mining? Well, 
I doubt that even if seabed mining were given a "full speed ahead" 
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as of this afternoon, it would have much of a chance of producing 
much of an impact on manganese supplies by 1985. However, there 
is concern in some areas that there may be a growing need for 
resources from this area. 
MR. YouNG: Those of us who have been around in this show for 
a while know that the last word on the matter is that of Vince 
McKelvey. I certainly appreciate his comments, and I hold no grief 
with the Assistant Secretary of Defense whom I also was criticising 
this morning. We have heard a number of remarks somewhat criti-
cal about the industry this afternoon, and I would be last to say that 
the industry is restricted to purely refined cobalt, copper, and man-
ganese. A number of people have been anxious to dissassociate 
themselves from any connections with industry; since I do not have 
one I do not have to. But I would like to remind ourselves before we 
adjourn, that none of us would be sitting here, concerned with this 
problem of sea mining or all the economic, social, technological, and 
environmental issues that go with it, if it had not been for the 
technological innovation and advance which was developed primar-
ily in the private sector in the United States. 
MR. Losco: If I might just respond very quickly to Roy's point 
about the congressional impatience. I think it stems from three 
factors. First in 1975, and perhaps earlier, administration officials 
continually came to Congress and said that if you did not pass the 
200 mile limit bill it would destroy the Conference, whose conclusion 
is around the corner. They continued to come up with that line for 
several sessions of Congress. Manana, manana, manana was some-
thing that the Congress got tired of hearing and they finally decided 
that they would not heed the administration's warnings anymore. 
The present administration is no longer using that line. 
The second factor is one that Ambassador Aldrich raised and 
that is the danger of frittering away technological leads. The United 
States may in some cases be resource poor but certainly technology 
is one of our key resources if we might want to call it a resource. We 
should continue to develop technology and export it wherever possi-
ble. If mining is somehow discouraged by a lack of a legal regime 
through domestic legislation or internationally through a treaty, we 
could be hurting ourselves in terms of technological exports. 
The third point is the one that Mr. McCloskey raised, and that 
is the congressional attitude now in foreign policy. It has been dem-
onstrated several times and I will not belabor the point. But Con-
gress, I think, is understandably impatient with the pace of the 
Conference and will seek to pass legislation this next Congress, per-
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haps this summer, definitely by 1980, and I think rightly so. Hope-
fully, it will be carefully drafted, avoiding adverse precedence and 
helping industry continue their technological development, while 
not undermining the conference. 
MR. LEE: I certainly appreciate Dick's point. The reason I 
asked for the floor is that I do think that Larry earlier mentioned a 
very important point in connection with the attributable portions 
that may be taxed. I understand that one of the problems is that 
the amount a miner could pay to the Authority depends on whether 
he will have to also pay tax to his own country. If he has to pay his 
home country and also where it was processed, then of course, the 
amount he can pay the International Authority will be reduced. In 
this connection I would like to take advantage of Dr. McKelvey's 
knowledge. I understand that in presenting what the industry, the 
miners, can pay to the Authority, they have automatically deducted 
28% that will be paid to their government. I do not know if this 
information is correct, but in comparison with what they state as 
the maximum they could pay, this is double the amount that they 
will be paying to the International Authority. 
MR. HERMAN: I cannot respond to that. 
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